The paper provides a theoretical contribution to the multi-level governance debate, discussing the role of the policy instruments in tailoring polities for local development strategies. To this purpose, it examines the Community-Led Local Development (CLLD), a policy tool of the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, which has generated more than 3000 local initiatives across the EU. An institutionalist perspective enables a reflection on the multi-level normative dimensions of these local initiatives. A combination of the post-functionalist governance theory, the soft space debate, state-theory and strategic-relational approach provides an interpretative framework to be deployed for a dedicated research agenda. The interpretative challenge is about whether the CLLD enables spatial-temporal fixes in which a deliberative polity pursues a spatial imaginary for an ad-hoc territory. The consequent analytical dimensions can be found in (a) the relationship between attendant ad-hoc polity, policy agenda, territorial design and societal processes; and (b) the meta-governance dimensions that locate the bottom-up constituency of this institutional technology in the shadow of state's hierarchy. An overview of the CLLD implementation across the EU provides evidence on the latter.
Introduction
Political science, human geography, and spatial planning studies have been widely occupied by the compelling question of the appropriate scale for policy action and the way institutions can address socio-spatial dynamics through the reconfiguration of the decision-making arrangements. Along the last decades, the new forms of decisionmaking processes and the experimental institutional arrangements among actors, both at different scales and beyond the public authority, have been addressed by the MultiLevel Governance debate. A series of interpretative concepts have allowed on the one hand a better understanding of the forms of interaction and power relations between the state and other institutional and policy actors (Piattoni, 2009 ) with a shift from a centralized structure to a more articulated functioning of a Westphalian statehood (Caporaso, 2000) , and on the other hand, the interpretation of the EU's role in the macro-scale governance process with the Member States (Heritier & Rhodes, 2010) .
In this frame, the necessity of going beyond the jurisdiction of public (local and regional) authorities in addressing socio-spatial phenomena through public actions has bourgeoned theoretical interpretations and empirical investigations of processes based on task-specific tailored space for policy action. Together with the investigation of the policy for which the tailored space is conceived, a broad variety of studies have underlined the importance of other dimensions, such as (a) the relationship between spatiality and territoriality (Faludi, 2013) , and the role of space as 'mean' and 'objective' of governance (Jessop, 2016) ; (b) the multi-level governance architecture of the process, and the vertical and horizontal shift of competences and power (Hooghe & Marks, 2009) ; (c) the construction of new polities as policy arena (Hajer, 2003) , and their institutional design; (d) the community's role in the process (Moulaert, MacCallum, Mehmood, & Hamdouch, 2013) ; and (e) the legitimacy of the socio-spatial constituency (Swyngedouw, 2005) .
The paper provides a specific contribution to this variegated field of knowledge. It uses the EU policy instrument Community-Led Local Development (CLLD), which is one of the novelties of the current EU programming period 2014-2020, to explore various dimensions of the existing debate and to combine them in a thorough interpretative approach for these socio-spatial and political phenomena.
Built on the experience of the former LEADER program, the CLLD has been conceived as a policy tool that fosters local development through the financial support of integrated local development strategies. It draws on a place-based approach (Barca, 2009 ) and strategic spatial planning (Albrechts, 2010) . It requires the definition of a strategy for a functional space tailored to specific local socio-economic characteristics, which usually cross administrative boundaries and whose coherence should be adequate to the local development vision. In the purpose of the initiative, the definition of the needs and of the features of the spatial strategy should be the outcome of a thorough involvement of the local actors in the decision making process, in partnership with local enterprises, public authorities and community representatives. These actors then should form a Local Action Group (LAG), a dedicated entity that is in charge of the strategy, the budget management, the implementation process through projects, and the monitoring activity. The composition of the LAG should ensure that the decision making power is not taken by a dominant actor, but rather it is shared among the wide range of partners.
The use of CLLD in the national or regional agendas is largely voluntary and depends on several factors, among which: the expenditure modalities of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); the intended spatial development agenda at various levels; and the local actors' mobilization and their proactive capacity. We can expect several interpretations, with a different application of the various financial options and their codification in local practices that will generate a kaleidoscope of local initiatives, themes and approaches. As it will be shown in this paper, the CLLD has reached the impressive number of more than 3000 initiatives across the EU. The CLLD implementation represents therefore a stimulating research subject, which will generate presumably several research agendas, both at national and cross-country level, with the aim of verifying the effectiveness of this approach and exploring its characteristics and added value from different perspectives, as well as highlighting bottlenecks, contradictions and missed opportunities.
In this context, the paper has the ambition to provide a frame for the multiple research agendas that can address these initiatives, moving beyond the policy evaluation and investigating the generated governance dynamics. The scheme here below reports the research questions associated to two dimensions: the 'how', in which the scientific debate is explored in search of conceptual tools to address what is at stake; and the 'what' about the necessity to contextualize the instrument in the EU policy and clarify its novelty and the variety of approaches that can take place at the local level in order to validate the interpretative scheme. An institutionalist perspective (Gualini, 2004; Salet, 2018) drives the exploration of the variegated debate on Multi-Level Governance and highlights the normative frame of the governance process enabled by the CLLD. The interpretative challenge is about whether the CLLD enables spatial-temporal fixes in which a deliberative polity pursues a spatial imaginary for an ad-hoc territory. The consequent analytical dimensions can be found in: (a) the relationship between attendant ad-hoc polity, policy agenda, territorial design and societal processes; and (b) in the meta-governance dimensions that locate the bottom-up constituency of this institutional technology in the shadow of state's hierarchy.
In order to expose it, the paper in its Part 1 builds up a theoretical framework, reflecting on the institutional technology that enables task-specific jurisdictions in charge of a local development strategy for a tailored territory. An interpretative scheme is presented and discussed. Part 2 describes how the CLLD is an initiative that is rooted in an EU policy context in which discourses and policy narratives are advocating a renewed territorial policy approach. Part 3 investigates the CLLD main technical and administrative features and its innovations, while Part 4 presents the state of play of its implementation across the EU, showing how its application that occurred in the various countries and regions has generated diversified approaches in terms of territorial foci and CLLD strategies. The conclusion evaluates the contribution of the paper and draws the line for further research agendas.
Framing the debate: a multi-level governance issue
2.1. Task-specific jurisdiction and its institutional dimensions
The reorganization of the governance process and the interactions among a variety of public authorities, local private actors and citizens through the identification of a tailored space has been addressed the post-functionalist governance thesis (Hooghe & Marks, 2009 ). The substantial contribution to the governance debate is rooted in the identification of two types of multi-level governance processes: general-purpose and task-specific jurisdiction, or type I and II governance. In planning literature, these two categories have been mutated in the distinction between hard-and soft-space initiatives (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009) , and they were mainly based on two distinguishing variables: the territory that is concerned by the governance process and the competences of the 'jurisdiction' applied to it.
The first type of governance, which is characterized by hard space, relates to the general-purpose, non-intersecting, and durable jurisdiction such as the one of established administrative levels of government, with a recognized territory and encompassing administrative competences. They have formal arenas and processes under the jurisdiction of the public authority, often statutory and open to democratic processes and local political influence. The second type relates to the task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdiction, and addresses in particular those policy arenas that go beyond formal territorialized authorities. The 'soft spaces' are ad-hoc designed territories where discretion and interpretation determine the spatial domain and implementation happens through bargaining and flexible arrangements (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009) .
The task-specific jurisdiction with soft space has been typically associated with crossborder cooperation under the EU initiative (Metzger & Schmitt, 2012) and metropolitan management in functional urban areas (Adam & Green, 2016) . They are characterized by a growing preference for using fuzzy boundaries in establishing new 'sub-regions' with a specific planning and policy task (Allmendinger, Haughton, Knieling, & Othengrafen, 2015) . At the same time, the tailored definition of a territory with its arbitrary boundaries, and the selectiveness of the involved actors are the primary constituency of the strategic spatial planning approach (Albrechts, 2006) advocated by the place-based narrative, out of which LEADER at first and the CLLD later have been conceived.
In the CLLD, moreover, as explicitly mention in its acronym, the involvement of the local community is a primary connotative characteristics. In these types of initiatives, the participation of local actors happens through voluntary commitment associated to the specific process in which a policy problem is first identified and then addressed with a strategic plan through animation and participatory process. Using Hooghe and Marks's description of Type II jurisdictions, these initiatives do not seek to resolve fundamental disagreements by deliberation but, instead, to share a collective project among individuals and actors who share some geographical or functional space and who have a common need for collective decision-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 205) .
This dimension brings in two considerations. First, it raises questions about political legitimacy and democratic representativeness of policy processes whose spatial and social agendas become arbitrarily selective (Swyngedouw, 2005) . The process based on voluntary adherence does not aim at solving disagreements but instead at conveying forces around a proactive policy project-'Type I jurisdictions choose citizens, while citizens choose Type II jurisdictions' (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 206) .
The alignment of actors to an existing hegemonic policy narrative or their exclusion from the political arena (Jessop, 2001 ) could therefore become an opaque technique deployed by hegemonic coalitions that removes the political dimension and neutralizes potential antagonistic voices. This appears to be the core of what critical geographers have pointed as a de-politicized process and the removal of the conflict in planning (Swyngedouw, 2005) . At the same time, it calls for new forms of collective control, as suggested by Metzger (Metzger, 2011) , who points at forms of forums and arenas in which institutional arrangements can be challenged.
Second, the institutional construction rather than the policy agenda becomes a political act. Hajer (2003) suggests that we should conceive what has been named type II governance or soft-planning initiatives more in terms of 'stand-alone practices' because they are not directly supported by traditionally legitimized institutional arrangements. The traditional authorities have a part in constructing the institutional frame, but they no longer have a direct democratic representative responsibility on these initiatives. The institutional dimensions of the stand-alone practices become themselves a prime site of politics (Hajer, 2003, p. 191 ) and need to be investigated as such.
Therefore, the policy investigation of CLLD strategies and results, albeit necessary, addresses only a partial dimension of its characteristics (see for instance FAME & FARNET, 2018). The above mentioned debate indicates that it is also worth investigating the enabled institutional characteristics in order to understand the political dimensions of its normative framework, which is based on the relationship between policy project, territorial design and community involvement, as discussed in the following subsection.
The territorial synchrony of the spatial-temporal fix
The importance of the institutional dimensions of the 'stand-alone practices', such as those enabled by the CLLD, points at the need to investigate the role of the newly formed arrangements and potentially new jurisdiction, or to use a slightly different term -with an important semantic implication -of its polity. While Hooghe and Marks have left unquestioned the nature of the polity and the institutional dimension of the governance process, Hajer (2003) pointed at the specificity of it, in particular highlighting the deliberative dimension of these types of polities. Hajer (2003) recognizes that the policy analysis can no longer consider polity as a stable entity, echoing Hooghe and Marks's emphasis on the proliferation of type II jurisdictions. He gives a strong emphasis to the discursive construction of the polity: the polity '(…) cannot be captured in the comfortable terms of generally accepted rules, but is created through deliberation. (…) As politics is conducted in an institutional void, both policy and polity are dependent on the outcome of discursive interactions' (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 161) .
If the task-specific jurisdiction generated under the CLLD initiative is a new territorialized polity (Piattoni, 2009 ) that emerges from a multi-level governance process, as it will be shown in Part 3, the discursive interaction has a specific and locally-created dimension in which the new polity, the functional territory, the involved actors and the policy agenda are bounded in a political project. Such a task-specific jurisdiction, even if very instrumental or weak, is a temporary polity constituted by an administrative board in which local public and private actors, and local public authorities could share the discursive construction of a functional territory associated to a development strategy, or in other terms, to a spatial imaginary.
These elements come together in what Hajer defines as the triangle of governance, whose synchrony -as he warned about -is at question. The 'triangle of governance' according to Hajer is made of three elements: politico-administrative institutions, societal processes and cultural adherences (Hajer, 2003, p. 182) . Such a specific governance setting is then understood in terms of a territorially based relationship among these three variables. In this 'triangle of governance', the legitimacy and effectiveness of politicoadministrative institutions are typically based on 'the successful ordering of societal processes as well as on the creation of sufficient cultural adherence in a particular territory' (Hajer, 2003, p. 182) . Therefore, the societal efficacy of these practices, which are no longer unquestionable (as in type I governance), could be considered in terms of territorial synchrony among the three components.
A state-theory and strategic-relational critique reinforces the interpretative capacity of the interrelations between spatial imaginary, policy instrument and polity; it goes beyond what appears to be the limit of Hajer's conceptualization, i.e. the sort of institutional void in which they are left alone. The institutional void has generated approaches that pointed at non-state-centric geographies associated with these practices (Walsh, Jacuniak-Suda, Knieling, & Othengrafen, 2012) , On the contrary, in Jessop's perspective (Jessop, 2016) , two important elements are connected in the political process: the institutional technology through which the process is activated -as well as the state is reaffirmed -and the spatialtemporal fix that is conveyed.
The scheme of Figure 1 brings together the threads of these approaches in a conceptualization of the governance dynamic and the role of its components. The hypothesis is that, despite being a project-funding mechanism, the CLLD can be challenged by this articulated interpretative scheme, in which the policy instrument generates a spatial temporary arrangement. Consequently, the 'territorial synergy' that connects a spatial imaginary with a socio-institutional process becomes an analytical dimension.
The spatial imaginary is a narrative construction that tights together a functional territory, based on a snapshot of its socio-ecological characteristics, and the strategic policy agenda (i.e. how the characteristics of the 'place' are mobilized). At the same time, the socio-institutional process indicates how the local community (or some communities instead of others) determines the political-administrative configuration of the taskspecific jurisdiction (e.g. of the LAG, in the CLLD case). It happens through the expression of a societal process that is territorially bounded and connected to the policy agenda. Consequently, a tailored space and its polity construction could be challenged in these analytical terms. Even if apparently modest as policy ambition and volatile as polity construction (as potentially the CLLD), it activates a place and path-dependent cultural process that is worth investigating.
Jessop describes such institutional configurations as a spatial-temporal fix, which is space-related and temporary. It (…) is a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, imposition, or chance evolution offer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in securing economic, political, or social order. (Jessop, 2016, p. 25) He builds on Harvey's interpretation (Harvey, 2001) , for which spatial fix refers to 'many different forms of spatial reorganization and geographical expansion that serve to manage, at least for some time, crisis-tendencies inherent in capital accumulation' (Jessop, 2006, p. 145) . Sharing the idea that a spatial-temporal fix is part of a process of destroying and re-configuring space in order to overcome overproduction, reduce a surplus of labour, and to deal with over-accumulation of capital, Jessop's interpretation emphasizes its political role.
In this sense, even a limited initiative such as the CLLD could be challenged in this terms. The spatial-temporal fix resolves, (…) partially and provisionally at best, the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in capitalism by establishing spatial and temporal boundaries within which a relatively durable pattern of 'structured coherence' can be secured and by shifting certain costs of securing this coherence beyond these spatial and temporal boundaries. (Jessop, 2006, p. 155) Here two dimensions are crucial. First, such a political dimension takes the form of a spatial and policy narrative, which strategically selects winners and losers linked to the uneven social and spatial distribution of benefits and to its associated local development strategy. Second, the space is not only a container of governance processes, as it would be in type I governance / hard space practice, but it becomes a means, through which a socioinstitutional order is temporarily established.
The meta-governance and its normative framework
Contrary to the idea of the institutional void (Hajer, 2003) , the meta-governance through which the state reaffirm itself plays a crucial role (Jessop, 2016) . If the meta-governance is the 'government of governance' (Bell, Hindmoor, & Mols, 2010) , the EU, the national and regional levels have a primary role in the definition of the CLLD governance dynamics, as extensively proven in Part 4 of the paper. The scheme in Figure 1 indicates four key dimensions (among the several ones that can be listed) that have a normative role in the multi-level decision making.
The two most visible roles are the definition of the rules and the financial support for the initiative; together they form the most explicit elements of the institutional technology. The rules for governance and the regulatory order under which the actors perform ensure the compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes. In the case of the CLLD, it combines for instance a hierarchical definition of elements (the funds, the characteristics of the process, etc.), and a recognition of bottom-up and deliberative decision-making by civil society groups through stakeholder-led democracy. At the same time, the financial arrangements support the activation of the policy process, such as the territorial design and its strategic policy agenda, as extensively shown in section 4 about the combination of ESI Funds.
However, there are other dimensions in which the meta-governance has a strategicselective capacity, such as the promotion of governance arenas and the narratives of different policy agendas. The former influence the promotion of practices and the activation of governance networks. It promotes -or disempowers -practices that enable the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in diverse strategic contexts and specific territories (Jessop, 2016) .
The latter identifies the importance of the policy agenda as an outcome of the interaction among different levels, combining hierarchic relationships and interpretation and re-construction of political discourses. The discourses in policy agenda are translated in policy strategies and they have an effect on financial arrangements and ultimately on the policy design at a local level. The conceptualization of the territorial cohesion agenda and H2020's aims at the EU level frame the policy construction of the CLLD at the national and regional levels, in which the interpretation of the EU policy message acts as a normative role through funds allocation and policy orientation.
The following section of the paper addresses in particular this issue. In the attempt of clarifying the characteristics of the CLLD, it investigates at first the policy narrative in which the CLLD was conceived.
A policy context: the rise (again) of a territorial narrative
The policy use of the EU Funds, when related to regional and economic development, sees at least two broad approaches. On the one hand, the mainstream way of allocating funds to the Member States and their regional authorities follows a set of specific criteria and targets, characterized by a substantial a-territoriality. On the other hand, some initiatives use a more integrated and spatial approach, combining strategic planning and local development modalities to address a more territorial-oriented policy agenda. The latter has characterized a small but significant portion of the European funds expenditure along for decades. In particular, with attention to the local dimension, the involvement of local actors and the support of bottom-up initiatives are part of a recurrent attention to 'community-led' practices (despite the ambiguity of this terms). The rise and the disappearance of several initiatives has been the focus of several studies in the broad field of the European Planning Studies (Dühr, Colomb, & Nadin, 2010; McCann, 2015) .
In particular, over the last decade of the previous century, strong attention toward urban deprived areas and a question about how to trigger local development dynamics gave birth to an experimental phase of innovative EU-led initiatives (Atkinson, 2001; Janin Rivolin & Faludi, 2005) . Among others, it is worth pointing at the Urban Pilot Project and URBAN programme, mainly dedicated to urban areas; LEADER programme dedicated to rural and fishery areas; and EQUAL programme, which did not have a spatial specification but had been mainly used in urban contexts for integrated actions toward specific social groups.
The common dimension of these policy tools was the experimentation of new ways of tailoring strategies for economic and social regeneration of specific places. At the core of their approach was a strong emphasis on bottom-up dynamics for the definition of a shared approach with the engagement of the beneficiaries of EU funds and enterprises, together with public authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social partners and citizens.
That historical period saw a stronger territorial specification of the quest for socioeconomic cohesion and spatial justice taking place under the debate on territorial cohesion (Faludi, 2006) , which became a flagship concept in describing the aim of the EU policy domain with an explicit spatial attention, albeit diversified political agendas connected to it (Servillo, 2010) . Despite being a niche in the Structural funds expenditure, these experimental programmes constituted the core of an EU policy domain explicitly dedicated to an integrated approach to spatial and territorial development and the operative tools for territorial cohesion (Dühr et al., 2010) .
However, as often in policy life-cycles, some of these initiatives disappeared after they reached a maturity phase. In particular, URBAN and EQUAL programmes lasted until the first EU programming period of the 2000s (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , when they became mainstreamed (Atkinson & Zimmermann, 2016) , with the loss of their experimental underpinning. The official narrative behind this choice stated the necessity to normalize the integrated territorial approach according to each Member State's necessity, and to simplify the procedures (McCann, 2015) . Hence, a Cohesion Policy structure with three Cohesion policy objectives embedded all the experimental initiatives, which were left to the decision of the Member States. Only the LEADER programme somehow survived (Dax, Strahl, Kirwan, & Maye, 2016) , leaving this local development tool dedicated to rural and maritime areas as the only explicit EU initiative inspired by a community-led approach.
A decade later, the discussion that preceded the current programming period (2014-2020) took on board a series of criticisms (Mendez, 2013) , including those about the controversial outcome of the pilot programme mainstreaming, as highlighted in the 5th
Cohesion report (European Commission, 2010) . This included a wider critique of the EU cohesion policy, concerning in particular the lack of territorial sensitivity, well summarized by the Barca report (Barca, 2009) . It remarked the failure of the one-size-fits-all of the traditional regional development approach and the importance of investments finalized to support local resources and social and territorial capital.
The place-based approach advocated by the Barca Report became a fortunate buzzword that carried a plea for a more local and endogenous development approach (Barca, McCann, & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012) . A higher recognition of a territorial dimension, a stronger role of local development, and a normative support in endogenous initiatives were the elements that brought a new momentum for initiatives based on community participation through bottom-up dynamics.
The current programming period contains a stronger territorial narrative that is present throughout the current ESI fund regulations and it attributes its legacy to the previouslydescribed debate. Elements of this narrative come back in the recitals and core articles of several documents, such as the Common Provisions Regulations, the Common Strategic Framework, the regulations for the individual funds, Commission guidance, and reports (De Bruijn, 2017) . In the language of the ESI regulations, territorial cohesion echoes a place-based approach-it is about combining ESI Funds into integrated packages, which are tailor-made to fit specific territorial needs taking the roles and specificities of different types of territories into account (European Union, 2013).
In this frame, the Common Provisions Regulations for the ESI Funds created three policy tools: CLLD, Sustainable Urban Development (SUD) and Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) (art 32-35 and 36). They are tools of the cohesion policy later named the 'Territorial Delivery Mechanism', which is an interesting term to make explicit their role in operationalizing the EU funds expenditure through a more pronounced territory-oriented vocation. A synergy among these instruments is also foreseen, it can be arranged by the Member States and their regional and local authorities to address specific socio-spatial challenges. However, only CLLD has an explicit community-led approach among the three policy tools (De Bruijn, 2017) .
The combination of a renewed cognitive and political approach to local development in the current EU programming period strengthens institutional framework made of discourse, rules and resources (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999) , which all together supports the diffusion of a new territorialized approach in the EU policy. The definition of Territorial Delivery Mechanisms is a prominent policy outcome, while CLLD represents -on paperthe most evident resurgence of a place-based approach.
The technical design of CLLD
The CLLD technical and administrative characteristics are framed by the new territorial narrative and have been specified by the EU regulation and additionally by two guidance notes issued by the EU Commission (European Commission, 2014a , 2014b next to the primary legislation. Even though the latter are not legal documents, they explain the intentions and were often used by Commission services to steer the implementation of the Member States and regions in a certain direction (De Bruijn, 2017) .
Out of these documents, the community-led dimension intended by the EU Commission appears to have four connotative dimensions -at least for the purpose of this study:
1. Integrated and multi-sectorial strategy, with a variegated portfolio of funds. 2. Specific tailored area, which goes beyond the traditional territorial jurisdiction of the public administration. 3. The Local Action Group (LAG), which represents the key institutional structure rooted in an innovative relationship between local society and public authority. 4. The multi-level articulation of choices that frame the implementation of the CLLD at the local level.
The first and more relevant element that characterizes the CLLD initiative is the Local development strategy tailored to the needs of the designated place. Although 'strategy' is not part of the acronym, the regulation puts great emphasis on the fact that the CLLD follows a strategic planning approach (Albrechts, 2010) . The CLLD strategy should indicate the target area and the related population, and should contain a SWOT analysis, a territorial strategy with a vision, an action plan, a management and monitoring plan, and a detailed financial structure, as it was for the previous LEADER programme.
The main difference between CLLD and LEADER is however the wider financial availability and, thanks to this, a wider operative capacity. The previous financial support for the LEADER initiative was limited to either the European Agricultural Funds for Regional Development (EAFRD) or the European Maritime and Fishery Fund (EMFF), with a resulting limitation to rural or coastal areas and a narrow range of eligible interventions. In the new version, the CLLD extends the LEADER approach to two other European Structural Investment Funds: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF). The CLLD strategy can be integrated and multi-sectoral through the support of different funds, mainly ESIF, but potentially also national ones.
As a consequence, the CLLD range of actions compared to LEADER has grown along two potential lines (Peters, 2013) . First, it has a broader thematic scope due to the eligibility of more thematic interventions under different ESI Funds, and thus potentially more integrated actions. Second, it addresses diversified scales and types of territory, which can go from urban neighbourhoods with specific sub-urban issues, or medium towns and wider urban agenda, to sub regions with a combined attention to smaller towns and rural areas, and eventually their urban-rural interlinkage.
This issue is the key decisional feature of the meta-governance that steers the implementation of the CLLD initiative. Whether the initiative will address for instance urban neighbourhoods with a socially inclusive strategy, or will target growth and economic development for local enterprises in a sub region with medium urban areas, depends on two correlated dimensions: the availability of funds made available by the multi-scalar decision-making; and the policy initiative at local and regional level taking place within the margin allowed by the Funds eligibilities.
The second crucial dimension is that the CLLD has the vocation to be local area-based, which is functional to the strategy-based approach. The CLLD can identify a tailored area according to its specific socio-spatial features and the appropriate match to the strategy. The CLLD articles do not refer to any type of area, implying that the CLLD can be applied anywhere. CPR-Article 32 states only that the CLLD should focus on sub-regional areas (European Union, 2013) . Despite its neutral definition, however, the Commission guidance on the CLLD stresses the wider possibilities at the disposal of the initiativeit has the opportunity to address also small urban centres in rural areas, deprived city neighbourhoods, industrial districts, brownfield sites, suburbs, etc. (European Commission, 2014b). As mentioned in the introduction, it represents an important novelty, considering that the 2007-2013 programming period the LEADER approach was limited in its territorial scope to rural areas covered by the EAFRD and fisheries areas covered by the EMFF.
There is an additional specification with consequences on the operationalization of the territorial target. The CPR fixes the demographic limits between 10,000 and 150,000 inhabitants (CPR art.33) for a single tailored area interested by CLLD strategy. In this way, it prohibits major cities to have a CLLD for their entire city but favours neighbourhood interventions, such as those in the former URBAN initiative and strategies dedicated to a group of small and medium towns and cities. This is in line with the growing policy awareness about small and medium sized towns in Europe and their territorial role (Servillo, Atkinson, & Hamdouch, 2017) .
The third -and essential-institutional characteristics of the CLLD are that the responsibility for the design and implementation of the community-led local development strategy should be given to a Local Action Group (LAG). Following the LEADER methodology, the LAG is an entity composed of representatives of public and private local socio-economic interests. The configuration of voting rights in the LAG is relevant because it introduces a new dimension of deliberate democracy. Neither the public authority in the sum of its constituencies nor any single interest group can have more than 49% of the voting rights (CPR, art32). Hence, the public authority becomes part of a composite polity that cannot be ruled by a single actor. This dimension challenges the traditional role of public authority, which is no longer the only state agency responsible for the budget dedicated to the local development strategy.
The LAG is tasked with designing and implementing the CLLD strategy and its operationalization. This includes the ruling of capacity-building and training initiatives for local actors and the financing of real projects brought forward by these actors. It is also in charge of animation (such as information campaign, support and promotion of activities, etc.) and participatory processes, which are financially covered by the CLLD budget. Once the CLLD strategy is approved, the cost of animation to facilitate exchange between stakeholders and capacity-building training actions can be up to 25% of overall costs. A lead Fund can support all running and animation costs, which make the integrated and coordinated use of the various ESI funds a prominent feature of the CLLD. Neither ITI nor other Territorial Delivery Mechanisms have such provisions.
It is noteworthy that the European Commission does not consider LAGs as formal intermediate bodies, i.e. an entity that plays a role in the management of European funds and needs to prove its capacity through administrative validation (as for instance the urban authorities dealing with the ITI in the ERDF management). Hence, it is rather a 'light' deliberative polity without strong legal commitment and territorial recognition if not for the management of the CLLD strategy.
Finally, the fourth dimension is the multi-level decision making process that acts as a meta-governance process framing the initiative. Although the community-led approach is the distinct feature of CLLD, the upper decision-making is determinant. This has everything to do with the design of the ESI Funds whose characteristics are not only set by the European Commission but further specified and implemented at the national and regional level by ministries and Managing Authorities of the various ESI Funds according to the shared management procedure (Mendez & Bachtler, 2011) .
The following steps are the fundamental steps in the establishment of the meta-governance framework. First, the decision of including the CLLD among the Territorial Delivery Mechanisms is a choice of the Member State. The decision is fixed in the Partnership Agreement signed between the EU Commission and the Member State at the beginning of the programming period. Then, the Managing Authorities of the ESI Funds at national and regional levels need to operationalize the choice and decide on two crucial variables: to confirm whether the CLLD is used for a specific fund and whether to integrate the funds in a joint Local Development strategy or use them in a mono-funded fashion. The operationalization will include also the decision on other 'arrangements' for the CLLD: whether there will be a lead fund, how the selection process for CLLD strategies is organized, which tasks are given to the LAGs, and what challenges CLLD should tackle.
Finally, the regulation (CPR, art 33) prescribes that individual CLLD strategies should be chosen by a selection committee set up by the Managing Authority(s) at the latest by 31 December 2017, through dedicated local calls. The principle is that candidate LAGs will be in competition with each other for designing the best CLLD strategy. This selection committee at the Managing Authority level will also decide on the funds involved and their allocated funding.
The dimensions of CLLD as a variegated government-led initiative
The decision-making that must to be undertaken before starting a community-led initiative forms meta-governance framework that acts deterministically toward the options available for the local implementation. Although the regulation is the same for all, the available funds and operational modalities for the CLLD can be different throughout the EU, both between the Member States and even between regions within the Member States. In this perspective, the CLLD instrument appears as a community-led as much as a government-led (and Fund-led) initiative.
The partnership agreements signed by each Member State with the EU Commission at the beginning of the programming period (in 2014) fix the type of funds that are eligible for the CLLD and whether to allow a multi-funding structure of the financed LAGs. Bearing in mind that the use of EAFRD is compulsory (5% of the EAFRD), the upper part of Table 1 lists the attribution of funds for the CLLD in each country. On the top are the countries that decided to accept the challenge (or at least to maintain openness to the possibility) to finance a wider array of interventions through several Funds (three or four ESIF). Descending in the table are the more conservative countries who decided to remain in the consolidated path of the previous programming period with only the agricultural and maritime funds eligible for the CLLD. Additionally, the bottom part of the table completes the picture distinguishing the countries that accepted the possibility to have multi-funded strategies and those who allowed only mono-fund strategies even if they indicated more than one eligible fund. On this specifically restrictive side are CY, EE, IE and NL, who allowed various funds but not in an integrated manner. Overall, the table shows a generally high potential reception of the CLLD innovative dimensions widespread across Europe. Almost 75% of the Member States accepted the multifunding principle in their partnership.
The real implementation of the CLLD initiative, however, shows a different and more articulated pattern. The overall figure of the implementation indicates a steady growth and a progressive consolidation of the initiative across the various programming periods, as reported in Table 2 . The decision to include again ERDF and ESF as eligible funds as it was originally conceived in the last decade of the previous century seems to have contributed to its development and the affirmation of a community-led way of approaching local development (Miller, 2014) .
The number of more than 3000 LAGs indicates a widespread phenomenon of practices in which Local Action Groups activated community-led initiatives in the EU. In particular, an increment of 50% of the LAG compared to the previous EU programming period indicates a recognition of the validity of the bottom-up approach or at least the will to experiment with it and the consolidation of this specific local development approach across the Member States.
The picture becomes more interesting when the overall sum of the current LAGs is broken down by fund composition, as indicated in Table 3 . On the one hand, the table shows that strong legacy with the former LEADER setting. In the current programming period, a large majority of LAGS has the same financial setting that was allowed in the previous programming period: 2201 LAGs are mono-funded EAFRD and 263 LAGs are mono-funded EMFF, while 66 multi-funded EAFRD-EMFF are just an integration of these two Funds (and their eligible interventions). They are LAGs with financial support to rural and maritime activities. Hence, despite 75% of countries that accepted the multi-funded possibility, the recurrent funding structure remains the one of the 'old LEADER approach', for which the 5% compulsory measure of the EAFRD is a determinant factor.
On the other hand, the novelty of using the two additional funds counts for one fourth of the total, with 788 LAGs combining the funds in different ways (Table 4 ). The ERDF and ESF can be used for mono-funded LAGs, for multi-funded LAGs with these two Miller (2014) for the period 1991-2013; own elaboration for 2014-2020 data (more details in Table 3 ). Servillo, 2017. funds, or in combination with EAFRD or EMFF. Therefore, these LAGs could be either a complete novelty for the administrations and the territories or a wider financial integration to the existing local development practices dedicated to rural and maritime areas (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018) .
Nevertheless, given the optional use of the CLLD under ERDF and ESF the uptake of the new financial opportunity can be qualified as a moderate success. The opportunity of activating multiple funds, including the newly available ERDF and ESF, has been well received in several contexts hereby strengthening the integrated, place-based and bottom-up approach of cohesion policy (Servillo, 2017) .
The tables show, however, certain inertia in taking advantage of the available financial innovation offered by the use of the new funds and the possibility to integrate them. Whether this is a matter of unavoidable resistance in pursuing changes in such a complex institutional framework or of national and regional strategic choices because perceived as an over-complicated financial procedure -or a combination of these factorshas been partially investigated elsewhere (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018) , but it still deserves a more dedicated study in particular adopting national or regional foci.
It is important however to highlight that the financial structure of LAGs has an important implication in the territorial outcome of local development strategies as indicated in Table 4 . The 75% of community-led initiatives consolidates the traditional LEADER approach mainly in the domain of rural and fishery development strategy. The remaining 'newapproach' initiatives extend their range of actions to a vast variety of actions and territories. In particular, it is worth underlining that the new funds ERDF and ESF, when used alone, confirm a resurgence of the URBAN and EQUAL-like initiatives, which focus explicitly on urban contexts. At the same time, the majority of the cases that integrate different funds tend to focus on sub-regional areas, whose strategy combines urban and rural dimensions, overcoming a structural limitation of the traditional LEADER approach.
A more detailed investigation of the territorial approach of the LAGs using the newly available funds (ERDF and ESF) has provided more insights in the relationship between funds, territorial focus and spatial strategy (Servillo, 2017; Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018) . Evidence in the study has shown that, when ERDF and/or ESF are combined with EAFRD, a predominant focus on sub-regions with rural characteristics and small urban settlements characterizes the majority of these CLLD strategies. At the same time, the multi-fund Table 3 ).
structure increases the chance to support a wider range of thematic interventions, integrating rural measure and regional development and/or social inclusion dedicated to the urban areas (Servillo & De Bruijn, 2018) . To conclude, these results show how the CLLD initiative has a strongly variegated application at national and regional levels. A much more in-depth analysis can be further conducted on the specific meta-governance implications in specific contexts and on the effects of the implementations that occurred at the local level. What remains clear, however, is that the above-exposed evidence indicates that the CLLD institutional technology, which pursues a bottom-up governance dynamics at the local level, is strongly influenced by the rules of funding, and therefore embedded in a meta-governance process in the shadow of multi-level state's hierarchy (Jessop, 2016) . Several meta-governance dimensions shape the framework in which local initiatives can take place. The enabled local polities have a socio-institutional and policy design that is framed by hierarchic decision-making, which characterizes the conditions of the CLLD implementation.
Conclusion
The paper contributes to the European Spatial Planning studies investigating the CLLD initiative used as a 'Territorial Delivery Mechanism' of ESI Funds in support of placebased practices. Its application in the EU counts for more than 3000 supported Local Action Groups and it indicates the wide-reach of this policy instrument to address local development within a renewed support of integrated territorial initiatives of the EU policy making.
An institutionalist perspective enables a conceptualization of the institutional dimensions as a challenge instead of a pre-given asset. Using Salet's words, (t)he evaluation of the public action's legitimacy and effectiveness requires on the one hand the understanding of the co-evolution of purposive action and situational problem articulation, and on the other hand the evaluation of the normative conditions on public action. (Salet, 2018, p. 59) In this light, the paper moves beyond the one-scale policy-content analysis, it provides a more encompassing interpretative frame, in which the operationalization of the initiative at the local level is connected with its contextual meta-governance. The theoretical investigation has provided the conceptual elements to identify the CLLD as institutional technology and the LAG as deliberative polity in which a socio-institutional process pursues a spatial imaginary in the shadow of multi-level state's hierarchy. Accordingly, the appropriateness of a tailored space for a local initiative cannot be evaluated in abstract terms, but only in connection with the associated policy-oriented spatial imaginary. The CLLD local initiative can be questioned -as indicated in Figure 1 through the connections between the following dimensions: the spatial-institutional design occurring between LAG and functional territory, the LAG's policy design of a policy agenda, the community's cultural adherence with the territory, and the societal process that casts the role of community in the policy-agenda implementation.
This perspective also allows for a deeper understanding of the local dynamics and their evaluation. Even if the innovative dimension of the LAG, whose decision power cannot be held by formal public authorities (with the limit of 49%), experiments a new form of democratic deliberation, its legitimacy and the generated power relation cannot be given for granted. The social adherence of the governance process is determined by the effectiveness of having an inclusive societal process in the implementation of the policy agenda. Hence, we need to recognize the strategic selectiveness of the initiative toward the local actors. The spatial imaginary through which a functional territory is associated with a policy agenda strategically selects the potential actors and projects to be financed. If not socially constructed, the risk is to fall in corporatist attitude at the advantage of local elites.
On the broad picture, the analysis of the current state of the implementation in the EU has shown to what extent the meta-governance of every Member State plays a determinist role. The variety of the CLLD implementation indicated how the operational dimensions of such an institutional technology conceived by the EU Commission have been applied in different ways in each national and regional context. Here, several factors were relevant in determining national and regional patterns, among which we can mention: (a) the divulgated examples and the supported narratives; (b) the selective attitude toward specific policy arenas, e.g. through the organization of dialogue among policy communities; (c) the selection modality of the LAG and the administrative process; and (d) the privileged territorial focus (e.g. urban areas vs. rural sub-regions) in connection with the ESI Funds allocation. These factors that were deployed differently in each country and region, moulding a meta-governance frame that constrains the characteristics of the bottom up process upon which the LAG and its spatial strategy are built.
Finally, a more structural question remains to be investigated: whether these initiatives become effective spatial-temporal fixes that contribute to a soft process of re-articulation of the state. The temporality of this spatially tailored initiative can, in the long term, produce interesting institutional changes in the administration, or become culturally and institutionally-established territorial structures. The social construction and the cultural adherence, more than the efficacy of the strategy, are probably relevant factors.
All these dimensions reveal variegated lines of compelling research agendas on the extensive variety of local development initiatives taking place across Europe under the institutional umbrella of the CLLD. At the same time, the interpretative scheme could be challenged on other policy initiatives, to verify and to implement its analytical validity.
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